

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376409664>

# Crime and fear of crime in four neighborhoods in Lima, Peru

Article · February 2015

CITATION

1

READS

253

1 author:



Noam López Villanes

Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

9 PUBLICATIONS 53 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Research Line

Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods

## **Crime and fear of crime in four neighborhoods in Lima, Peru**

Noam López Villanes

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers

No. 3

International Center for Violence Research – ICVR

A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary  
Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG

Universität Bielefeld  
Universitätsstraße 25  
33615 Bielefeld  
Germany

Project Webpage  
<http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/>

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers  
<http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html>

Contact  
[icvr@uni-bielefeld.de](mailto:icvr@uni-bielefeld.de)

The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s).

Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University.

If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [icvr@uni-bielefeld.de](mailto:icvr@uni-bielefeld.de)

The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).

## Acknowledgements

The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.

For that purpose, the Bielefeld University's International Center of Violence Research (ICVR) entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru in Lima.

The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines: "Parties, Passion, and Politics", "Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence", "Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods", "Violence in the Twilight Zone", and "Violence against Women". These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events, violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and vigilantism.

This chapter documents research that was conducted in the Research Line "Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods". Within the context of the Global South, research on violence mainly focuses on issues related to violent countries, national histories, periods, and policies, as well as institutions and phenomena such as police, military, youth gangs, militias, drug economies, and violent religious groups. The research mainly approaches violence from a national perspective, but also broadens the scope to include larger entities, such as continents and sub-continents. The aim of the research on "Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods" is to identify local social mechanisms for a) direct control and prevention of violence and b) factors in the social context which enable or restrict the success of both community-based and national measures designed to achieve control and prevention of violence.

Bielefeld, February 2015

Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann

Research Line  
Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods

**Crime and fear of crime in four neighborhoods in Lima, Peru**

Noam López Villanes

**Abstract**

This research addresses crime and fear of crime in four neighborhoods of Metropolitan Lima. Taking a micro-sociological perspective, I explore the social mechanisms that neighbors use and the public policies that local governments implement to tackle crime and fear of crime in areas where there are different levels of burglary and theft. A comparative qualitative methodology was applied. Fear of crime in these neighborhoods is a complex phenomenon in which several factors are involved. These include the performance of the police, the community policing managed by local government, individual and collective crime prevention strategies, the leadership of the local authorities, the economic resources of citizens and local governments, as well as certain aspects of neighborhood infrastructure.

**Keywords:** violent crime, fear of crime, social capital, social control, community policing, Peru

**Noam López Villanes**

Noam López holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Government at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and a Master of Economic Engineering at the National University of Engineering in Peru. He works as a quantitative specialist at the Peruvian Observatory on Drugs of the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs - DEVIDA for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Peru. He is a lecturer in the Social Science Department and a researcher at the Laboratory on Social Criminology, and Studies on Violence at the Interdisciplinary Group for Computational Research of Social Complexity at PUCP. Noam works primarily on research topics such as public safety, security technologies, drug trafficking, design and evaluation of security investment projects.

## Introduction

Violence is a key obstacle to development; it undermines democracy, and aggravates poverty (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014; Pearce, McGee and Wheeler, 2011). Even though violence has played a role in the history of most nations, nowadays, the effects of criminal violence are most striking in the developing countries in the global South (The World Bank, 2011). Latin America has been identified as violence-prone because it has the highest rates of homicides and because of the variety of its violence (Imbush, Misse and Carrión, 2011). These criminal phenomena have been observed by scholars, but crime and violence research in this region has been viewed from a national perspective, which leads to loss of information (Weisburd, Groff and Yang, 2012). Taking a micro-perspective approach in my research, I draw attention to the social mechanisms that enable some neighborhoods in Metropolitan Lima in Peru to be less violent than others.

In South America, Peru is of interest, because its citizens consider insecurity a major problem (LAPOP, 2012). In recent years the capital city, Metropolitan Lima, has not been the only city with high crime levels: violent crime has also plagued several cities the north and south of the country (Public Ministry of Peru, 2013), despite economic and population growth. Peru is part of the international debate on crime and fear of crime, but there are few studies, and the social mechanisms of crime control and crime prevention have not been documented in comparison with other countries in the global South.

Metropolitan Lima is a city of many contrasts – not only in terms of economic issues but also related to crime. Some neighborhoods have the reputation of being quite unsafe at any time of the day, not necessarily because of the number of deaths but because of the number of robberies and thefts. Residents of some of these neighborhoods live in the expectation that something might happen at any time at home or in the street. They are afraid that something may happen to their children, their parents, or their property. Fear is so widespread that in any district, even those where the official statistics and the surveys claim it is not dangerous, residents say “*anywhere and anytime you can be stolen in Lima.*”

In this research, I explore the factors who are related to the differences in violent crime and fear of crime in four neighborhoods in Metropolitan Lima. Studying fear of crime in this city is relevant because it is perceived by its citizens (53.9% of the population) as one of the most insecure capital cities in Latin America, just below Mexico City, where 54.7% of its population feel the same (LAPOP 2012, 89). It is relevant also because the fear of crime in Metropolitan Lima is not produced by high rates of homicides or visible gang control but more by robberies and thefts. In the last surveys conducted by Lima Como Vamos, every year since 2010 robberies and thefts have been the most important problem and, in 2013, 80.3% of Lima's population believed this was the case (Lima Como Vamos 2014, 10).

Fear of crime is examined in this research on the basis of the differentiation that Boers (1991) introduced between social and personal fear of crime. Social fear of crime refers to a person's perception of society being threatened by crime and the way society deals with this issue. It consists of three elements: perception of crime as a social problem, attitudes to punishment, and attitudes to crime policy. In contrast, personal fear of crime refers to the fear of becoming a victim of crime, or as Ferraro describes, "an emotional response of dread or anxiety in relation to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime" (Ferraro: 1995, 24).

The research, which was conducted in two districts in Metropolitan Lima, analyzed the reasons why fear of crime affects some neighborhoods, which were classified as violent or non-violent, depending on the number of complaints of robbery and theft as well as victimization surveys. The main research question is how are social capital and social control related to crime and fear of crime? Answering this question in the Peruvian case is relevant because there is a lively debate about the notion of social capital as a potential community-level resource that can be mobilized to build up neighborhood safety (Bursik, 1988; Sampson, 2001). In the case of social control, I make reference to the local police officers who provide safety. Unlike social capital, the role of a political institution such as local government in topics related to citizen security has not yet been explored in the literature.

Hence, the research explores whether fear of crime is present in the population residing in the selected neighborhoods. Crime is perceived in varying degrees because of the presence of actors and the existence of social mechanisms that somewhat mitigate the levels of victimization with strategies for crime prevention and crime control. To answer the main question a qualitative research methodology was used. Interviews, questionnaires, and non-participant checklists for six types of actors in selected neighborhoods were applied. Secondary information provided by surveys and official data provided by the police and local government was also used.

## **The Context**

With over 8.7 million inhabitants, Lima is the fifth largest city in Latin America and its population represents almost one third (30.9%) of the country's total population (UNDP 2012: 43; INEI, 2014). This is the result of rapid population growth, due to mass migration from the countryside to the city between approximately 1950 and 1975 because of the modernization of road infrastructure, industrialization, and the desire to obtain access to better services. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, migration also occurred due to the internal armed conflict that dramatically affected the rural areas in the country.

Migrant populations settled in Lima Cercado, one of the oldest districts, which goes back to the times of the Spanish colony, as well as relatively young areas such as North Lima, South Lima, and East Lima. Metropolitan Lima has witnessed increased commercial dynamism in the last two decades in these three regions, which would explain a slight reduction in poverty levels: 32.6% in 2005 decreased to 14.1% in 2008 (INEI, 2009). Nevertheless, this growth has not helped to reduce the socioeconomic gaps between districts and various segments of the population. In Metropolitan Lima, the per capita income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, has remained unchanged at 0.44 between 2004 and 2009 (INEI, 2009).

Lima is one of the Latin American cities in which most of its citizens are afraid of being the victim of a robbery or a theft whenever they leave their homes. 80% of the population considered crime and insecurity the main problem of the city, and 6 out of 10 people feel insecure, i.e. they experience fear of crime (Lima Cómo Vamos, 2014). An immediate question after reading this statistic is how many of these people actually suffered any victimization? Although published data in the latest survey by Lima Como Vamos does not allow us to address this question, it's clear that they are certainly fewer: in terms of victimization 3 out of 10 people were the victim of a robbery in 2013 (Lima Cómo Vamos, 2014).

Lima is composed of a number of districts, two of which are Miraflores and Lima Cercado with a population of 276,000 and 82,000, respectively (INEI, 2014). Both have the same social and political institutions. Each has a local government, but in Lima Cercado the authority is the same as that of Metropolitan Lima. Local governments have teams engaged in providing public safety services called the "Serenazgo", a form of community policing that is composed of administrative staff and operational staff (the "serenos"). Serenos are agents employed by the municipality to monitor the streets for any incident, not just those involving criminals, and report it to a control center. The control centers then communicate with stations of the National Police of Peru, which are also mainly responsible for providing security in the district. Some districts also have neighborhood organizations that are linked with both the Serenazgo and the police.

A historical review of the serenos leads us back to colonial times. The oldest records are from Spain in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when the serenos were responsible for policing the streets of towns and regulating the lighting at night, carrying a small stick and a whistle. It was the duty of the serenos to walk up and down the streets of their zones; they used to guard the places where thieves and criminals attacked their victims (Andrés, 1860: 534-535). The first serenos lived solely on donations or tips from the residents in the towns where they worked, but gradually they came to receive a salary – usually from the municipalities.

In Peru, serenos appeared during the Viceroyalty, and they had the same responsibilities as their peers in Spain. There are no exact records of the beginning of the Serenazgo as an




institution, but it also came to Peru from Spain, along with the Municipal councils, and played an important role in taking care of the neighborhood, keeping order, solving neighborhood disputes, and also providing potable water, and announcing loudly the time each hour in the evening. During the Viceroyalty, the city of Lima was divided into neighborhoods with their respective mayors, whose mission was to monitor the order in their districts, making night rounds and arresting vagrants and criminals. In 1805 a Body of Security Police was created in Lima. Its members were serenitos and, during the early years of the Republic, they had responsibility for maintaining order.

Nowadays “Serenazgo” fights crime and collaborates on citizen protection with the National Police in many cities of Peru. Outside Lima each provincial municipality has a team of Serenazgo. Since 2003, with the emergence of a law on the “Municipal Serenazgo”, every municipality in Peru can have its own Serenazgo. Article 85 of the Organic Law of Municipalities, which is related to citizen security, decrees that the “Serenazgo” is a legitimate actor inside the citizen security system alongside the National Police and the participation of the civil society. The other actors recognized by law are Citizen Vigilance, the Peasant Rounds, and the Urban Rounds (Congress of the Republic of Peru, 2003).

Although the Serenazgo is a legal actor, its functions are not completely clear. Until 2013, there was no official discussion on its functions, obligations, and capabilities. Congress received a draft bill on the regulation of the services to be rendered by the Municipal Serenazgo, but it has yet to be approved (Congress of the Republic of Peru, 2013). There are some misunderstandings about the training, labor conditions, and salaries that the serenitos should have. The complementarity of the work of the Serenazgo is also not clear. At the district level, with respect to the production of statistic information, the police and the Serenazgo usually do not work together and report different indicators for distinct modalities of crime. In the districts in Metropolitan Lima, the municipalities have worked on the standardization of functions, but just a few of them give this any priority.

Figure 1 shows the whole picture of the official provision of citizen security by the Peruvian State at a national level. According to the cycle of the public policy, the first stage is related to the design and formulation of the Public Policy of citizen security, which is elaborated mainly by the National Council of Citizen Security. This policy has 4 components: violent crime prevention, control and prosecution, rehabilitation and social reintegration of offenders, and attention to victims. Monitoring and evaluation of public policy are mainly the responsibility of the National Council of Criminal Policy. What is striking is the involvement of the National Police, the municipalities (Serenazgos), neighborhood committees, and rondas campesinas (peasant rounds) in crime prevention.

**Figure 1. State organizations committed to the Public Policy of Citizen Security**

Source: Ministry of Interior, 2013. Prepared by the author


A brief historical review of Lima reveals that the great migrations that occurred from the middle of the last century gave rise to the formation of slums around Lima Cercado (a map of this district can be seen in Figure 2). Barrios Altos is an area that became a thoroughfare for people from different regions of Peru selling their merchandise (Reyes 2005: 224). Inns served as makeshift accommodation and then became permanent homes. Barrios Altos became an area where "most multifamily buildings were on one level, with stone foundations, walls of adobe or thatch, wood floor, with one or more courtyards within, and common toilets. While the original structure remains, the multifamily, family and neighborhood economies have been transformed" (Reyes 2005: 232).

Within Barrios Altos "La Huerta Perdida" is located, a small neighborhood that was already recognized as dangerous due to the frequent robberies and thefts and has the same physical infrastructure 40 years later. "With small, narrow alleys that make it difficult for motor vehicles to transit freely and that make strangers get lost, coupled to the lack of illumination in the evenings and unexpected exit passageways, it permits people who commit criminal acts to find easily refuge without their being able to be arrested by the police" (Fukumoto, 1976: 58).

Currently, "La Huerta Perdida", and generally Barrios Altos, concentrates a low-income population; the infrastructure is old and run-down, with a lot of garbage in the streets, giving the area a foul smell and the lighting at night is low". Barrios Altos is still a place that connects several districts, where storehouses for commercial centers located in other areas of Lima Cercado have recently appeared. Officers of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima

and the National Police of Peru have identified Barrios Altos as one of the most dangerous areas of Lima.

**Figure 2. Maps of Lima Cercado and Miraflores**



Map of Lima (Source: Google Maps), the copyright of this map is held by Google Maps. The use is allowed under the "fair use" clause of the Copyright Law.

South-west of Lima is Miraflores, one of the iconic modern districts in the capital (see Figure 2). In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, with the loss of almost all the residences during the war with Chile (1879-1883), it witnessed a gradual increase in its population and its infrastructure, and in 2011 it obtained city status (Avendaño 1989: 6). For the last 40 years, Miraflores has presented a good urban and economic development compared with other districts. It is also one of the districts with the most tourist attractions. It has not only neighborhoods with a higher socioeconomic status population such as La Aurora but also neighborhoods such as Santa Cruz, where families of modest means live above small shops.

## Theoretical Frameworks

Violence is a topic that arouses fear and fascination, condemnation and condonement, but which is at the same time a dynamic concept that varies in place and time, and, consequently, lacks an agreed definition (Brookman and Robinson, 2012: 563-564). There is an extended discussion about its definition (de Hann, 2010). In this research the term violent crime means the violation of criminal law when a person intentionally uses violence against another. This is widely used by the National Research Council of the American Academy of Sciences, which defines violence as "the behaviors of individuals who intentionally threaten, attempt, or inflict physical harm to others" (Reiss and Roth, 1994: 2). This definition includes a variety of behaviors such as homicide, assault, robbery (with violence or intimidation), rape, and torture.

Violence is a multifactor phenomenon. One of the theories that was created to capture its different components is the "ecological model", a framework from a public health perspective

proposed by experts from WHO and PAHO. This model classifies four levels of risk factors: individual (biological and personal history factors who influence how individuals behave); relationship (factors related to the interaction with the primary networks: family members, friends, partners, and peers); community (factors related to the behavioral development in the neighborhood, school, and workplace); and society (broad factors who reduce inhibitions against violence such as cultural background, drugs and weapon trafficking, social and economic inequality, public policy effectiveness, the efficiency of legal and justice systems) (WHO, 2002). These “risk factors for violence are conditions that increase the likelihood of becoming a victim or a perpetrator of violence” (Imbush, Misse and Carrion, 2011: 120).

In this research violent crime is linked with community characteristics according to the ecological model. A large body of empirical research has focused on the effect that social and organizational characteristics of urban communities have on crime rates using social disorganization theory can be found (Silva and Villarreal, 2006: 1725). One of the first investigations was that by Clifford Shaw and Henry Mackay (1942), who found that the characteristics of a community such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility disrupt social organization, reducing exercising social control in an urban neighborhood, and, thus generating higher rates of crime. Later in time, other authors such as Bursik and Grasmick 1993, and Sampson and Groves 1989, proposed a similar formulation.

Among the community factors suggested by social disorganization theory, social capital is one of the key concepts related to crime and fear of crime. Social capital refers to the social support networks, local institutions, shared norms of trust and reciprocity, and collective activities among community members that can be used to produce the common good (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995). Thus, social capital is a potential community-level resource that can be mobilized to enhance neighborhood safety (Bursik, 1988; Sampson, 2001). In a neighborhood with ethnic heterogeneity, family disruption, and poverty, it is difficult to establish effective relational networks and to maintain a cohesive value system. “According to social disorganization theory, structural disadvantages weaken families, neighborhood institutions, and informal networks, which in turn weaken the sources of formal and informal social controls and allow crime to flourish” (Hawdon and Ryan 2009: 528).

In neighborhoods with weak ties social control is seen as a collective efficacy, referring to the shared expectations and mutual civic engagement of community members and focused on residents with capacity to act together to find solutions to local problems (Sampson, 2001). In the reviewed literature there are measures of collective efficacy such as neighborhood watchmen and public forums composed of neighbors, in which they discuss the problematic issues of the community in order to reduce crime and fear of crime (Ferguson and Mindel, 2007). But these two phenomena are not necessarily always related, so the measures of collective efficacy need to be differentiated.

Several studies have shown that victimization of criminal activity is related to fear of crime (see May and Dunaway, 2000; Huhn 2012, 25). There is extensive literature on fear of crime due to an increase in the levels of victimization, mostly in North America (Baumer, 1979; Garofalo, 1979; Clemente and Kleinman, 1997; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997; Galea and Karpati and Kennedy, 2002). However, this fear is developed not only at an individual level but also as a social phenomenon that is spread throughout a community and can be spatially associated with a particular territory. In other words, fear of crime is based not only on evidence of high crime or a cognitive response to what is linked to crime (Ferguson and Mindel, 2007), but also on a panorama of perceptions, which lead to automatic classification of a given area or neighborhood. There is a landscape of fear in which certain places (the dark alley, the isolated train station, the park after dark) are regarded as dangerous locations where the risk of crime is perceived to be greater than elsewhere.

Fear of crime is related to crime, but in urban clusters where fear of crime is greater and even inversely proportional to crime in terms of the rates of homicide or robbery and theft per 100,000 people, fear of crime is a big social problem. This dissociation between crime and fear of crime has been widely studied and the social disorganization theory indicates that the presence of subcultural diversity, disorder or incivility, and community characteristics are factors which increase the fear of walking on the streets at any time, or leaving the house alone without 'safety devices' such as pepper spray or a whistle (Garofalo and Laub, 1978; Lewis and Maxfield, 1980; Warr, 2000, Taylor, 2001; Lane and Meeker, 2003; McCrea, 2005). Within this theory, aspects such as migration and people with a different appearance (not only racial factors) increase the sense of fear.

Likewise, particular theories such as the "broken windows" theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), which is related to the social disorganization theory, focus on the infrastructural characteristics that can eventually raise levels of fear of crime. In other words, the occurrence of issues such as poor illumination, garbage in the streets, narrow alleys, graffiti, abandoned houses, and lack of security devices in public places raises the fear of being robbed (Miceli, 2004). This research suggests that the way in which the architectural growth of a city is planned, and the economic role that it plays in a given territory, would make it possible to locate factors causing citizens not to feel safe.

Fear of crime has consequences that affect society and its institutions: it may fracture the sense of community in an urban area (neighborhood) and turn public spaces into "no go" areas (Morgan, 1978); it can cause populations to migrate to other locations (Sampson and Wooldredge, 1986); it reduces interest in liberal penal policies such as the release of prisoners or rehabilitation and increases support for punishment and imprisonment (Langworthy and Whitehead, 1986). Fear of crime creates a hotbed of discontent that

legitimizes the criminal justice system and encourages vigilant justice practices that use measures that incur greater violence (Scheingold, 1984).

Not addressing the fear of crime as a social problem means that people continually live in the situation in which their freedom is constrained. These people want to spend more time at home and, depending on their financial capacity, acquire more security devices such as locks, grilles, reinforced doors, alarms, cameras, and private guards. They avoid walking in public places that are considered dangerous, avoid passing close to places with "people who might look like criminals", and also avoid using certain types of public transport, or avoid attending open entertainment events (Box, Hale and Andrews, 1988). Fear of crime accompanies each family member and makes people take drastic measures that reduce opportunities for socialization. Fear of crime thus generates isolation, mistrust, and ultimately undermines the formation of social capital.

If the fear of crime is a latent concept (subjective and perceptual), it is often stimulated by the media. There is research that suggests how harmful the news can be when criminal acts are broadcast at any time of the day, giving the idea that at any time any of us could be a next victim of a robbery or theft. The more the news is reproduced, the greater the sense of fear (Ferraro and LaGrange 1985, Garland 2000; Siehr 2004).

But fear of crime is not all bad; it promotes the emergence of more social interaction in favor of seeking mutual aid among people of the same community against real threats (Meeker, 2000), which is in turn mediated by a sense of discomfort within their neighborhood (Palmer, 2005). The emergence of social capital, or at least collective efficacy, arises from the same neighborhood initiatives (Galea, Karpati and Kennedy, 2002). Addressing social capital as a result of the fear of crime, as we have stated before, is to see it as a set of rules, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations of a small group within the social structure that is formed to allow the achievement of both individual and community objectives (Narayan, 1993; Lederman, 2002).

Social capital can deliver positive results, but some researchers have considered the negative aspects that it can bring. Sometimes the idea of integration between neighbors can be misused to wrongly implement informal negative sanctions, where only some people have control and they may even commit actions to prejudice people against others through avoidance, physical damage, or gossip (Coleman, 1990; Bursik, 1999). Thus, in some cases, social capital can worsen the levels of violent crime and fear of crime. As Lederman, Loayza and Menendez state: "in certain contexts, stronger social interactions allow individuals involved in criminal activities to more easily exchange information and know-how, which diminishes the costs of crime. Furthermore, these social interactions may facilitate the influence of criminals on other community members, who may then develop a propensity for crime and violence" (Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002: 510).



Despite discrepancies, most of the cases of social capital and social control generate neighborhood satisfaction and the need to take action in contexts of insecurity. Besides these prominent variables, the literature also mentions other important variables such as neighborhood characteristics, the strategies for crime prevention, the direct or indirect experience of victimization, the influence of the means of communications, the work of the police and other organizations, as providing security, as well as control variables or more structural variables such as sex, age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (Vilalta, 2010; Lane & Meeker, 2003; Taylor, 2009; Ferguson and Mindel, 2007). There are explanatory models in which these variables are collected and serve as a guideline for this research in which the model developed by Ferguson and Mindel (2007) stands out.

From this literature two important questions emerge for the case of Metropolitan Lima. One has to do with how social capital among neighbors affects crime and fear of crime. In other words, how strong are the social networks in which collective mechanisms are created to reduce the levels of fear of crime produced by delinquency. The other asks about how social control promoted by local government affects crime and fear of crime. Specifically, how the implementation of local policies in recent years has affected the levels of fear of crime and people's perceptions.

While this research focuses on fear of crime, it also addresses the social mechanisms and the context factors for violent crime control and prevention. It seeks to discover whether there are strong social ties among members, common ritual practices, or a strong sense of belonging and community. Likewise, if there are covenants or agreements including corrupt practices, solidarity, and communication problems. This research also incorporates the participation of actors who determine the control or prevention of violence and the fear of crime.

## **Method**

This is a qualitative cross-sectional research because the goal is to understand, in depth, the viewpoint of the research participants who live or work in violent and non-violent neighborhoods. In general terms this study focuses "on the meanings of experiences by exploring how people define, describe, and metaphorically make sense of these experiences" (Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009: 165). In particular, it seeks to understand the experience of the people who live in neighborhoods on the basis of their meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions about crime as well as people's actions (Berg, 2007). In other words, this study does not seek to infer or predict nor aim to discover general laws, which might govern the dynamics of violent crime and fear of crime in neighborhoods, but to describe the perceptions of the neighbors and the

local governments in Metropolitan Lima as well as the social mechanisms used to control and prevent violent crime.

Qualitative field research suits the phenomenon of criminal violence in neighborhoods. As John Lofland and his colleagues argue, this approach is appropriate for identifying practices, episodes, encounters, roles, and social types, social and personal relationships, groups and cliques, organizations, settlements and habitats, social worlds and subcultures and lifestyles (Lofland et al., 2006: 123-132). This is possible because qualitative research works with data collected with a variety of collection methods. "These include interviews with individuals, observations of people, places and actions/interactions, immersion in settings so as to understand the what, how, when, and where and how of social structure and action/interaction, the analysis of the media (written, spoken, drawn, etc.) content, and guided conversations with groups of individuals (focus groups)" (Tewksbury, 2009: 43).

While most research considered in the review of literature on crime and fear of crime has been done using a quantitative approach, this research does not seek to find the determinants of why one neighborhood feels more crime than the other. Nor does it seek to test a hypothesis; it does not seek to generalize to all neighborhoods of Lima, and is not expected to identify systematic patterns of association of crime or fear of crime. Rather it seeks to collect "the complex, contingent, and context-sensitive character of social life, and the extent to which actions and outcomes are produced by people *interpreting* situations in diverse ways, and acting on the basis of these interpretations, rather than passively responding to external causes" (Hammersley, 2013:11). This research involves 'natural' settings in which people live and work, and it uses interviews as the main instrument to gather information of control and crime prevention.

## Research Design


The selection of neighborhoods in Metropolitan Lima was a challenging task because, based on journalistic sources, there are many neighborhoods that are considered to be violent, but as there are no disaggregated data at this level, it is difficult to make an accurate comparison. Since the information was at the district level, a comparison was made among four neighborhoods in two districts with similar rates of robbery and theft, but different degrees of fear of crime. The selection of these cases is appropriate because of two reasons. First, because the two districts are different in terms of socioeconomic status, so we can compare them and arrive at insights into whether having more economic resources is related to less violent crime in terms of robberies and thefts and fear of crime, basically because people with high economic status can spend more money on security equipment. These two districts are a sample that shows the contrast of how Lima is composed. Second,



because the neighborhoods inside these two districts permit us to distinguish which of them are more violent than the others, even when they share the same socioeconomic characteristics.

To get neighborhoods with these characteristics, information from the National Police of Peru about the number of complaints of burglary and theft it was used as well as surveys of victimization and fear of crime from Lima Cómo Vamos and Ciudad Nuestra. The neighborhoods chosen were Mirones and Barrios Altos in Lima Cercado, and the neighborhoods of Santa Cruz and Aurora in Miraflores. Both districts are similar in terms of reporting rates (see Figure 3), but their perceptions of insecurity are different: in Lima Cercado 76.3% of households feel unsafe while in Miraflores this figure is the just 34% (Ciudad Nuestra, 2012).

**Figure 3. Rates of complaints of robberies and thefts in Lima Cercado, Miraflores, and Metropolitan Lima**



LC: Rates of Lima Cercado  
LM: Average rates of Metropolitan Lima  
Source: National Police of Peru

In this respect there is some controversy regarding the use of reporting rates as an indicator of victimization since it is linked to the State's ability to record complaints in police stations and to whether populations are in the habit of making complaints (López, 2013). If we examine the phenomenon of robbery and theft in Metropolitan Lima as a pyramid at the top, we can find those cases that appear in the media; below them would be the official data recorded by the police and other organizations that provide security; below that the "reported violence" from surveys, and finally at the bottom the "non-reported" violence, which would occupy more space (Imbush, Misse, and Carrión, 2011: 89). One way to assess the problem of underreporting in Lima is to use the results of victimization surveys such as those made by Ciudad Nuestra (2012). In this case, Lima Cercado reported 46.8% of victimization, while Miraflores just 29%. The major objection to this survey is that victimization considers more than 8 types of crimes whereas theft is not taken into account, and as you can see in Figure

3, theft is common in Miraflores. While theft for Ciudad Nuestra lacks relevance because it does not generate any physical damage, it does generate fear of crime and is therefore considered important in this research.

**Figure 4. Maps of the Barrios Altos and Mirones Alto in Lima Cercado**



Barrios Altos



Mirones Alto

Maps of Santa Cruz and Aurora in Miraflores



Santa Cruz



Aurora

Map of Lima (Source: Google Maps), the copyright of this map is held by Google Maps. The use is allowed under the "fair use" clause of the Copyright Law.

The four neighborhoods were selected on the basis of zoning elaborated by local governments, and also used by the police. In the exploration stage of this research, the employees of the Management of Public Safety of each local government helped us to choose the neighborhoods according to the data they had registered and their experience working in these zones. During the field research, we realized that these zones coincide with the neighborhoods because of their formation over time. Geographically, these neighborhoods are delimited by main avenues, have their own parks, schools, markets, soccer fields, police stations, and booths of Serenazgo. Also, they look similar in contrast to the next neighborhoods, even when they do not always look as rectangles seen from above (see Figure 4).

To gather information these tools were used: semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire with open questions, a guide for non-participant observation and a questionnaire with closed questions for pedestrians. The semi-structured interview guide was developed to gather information about the characteristics and the changes people have witnessed in their

neighborhood from the time they have been residing or working in the area; perception of fear of crime; crime prevention and the mechanisms used to control crime; and finally, their experiences with crime, and the mechanisms used from the creation of social capital in the area.

The interviews were applied according to the type of social actor. In order to maintain comparability among neighborhoods, six actors were considered: young people and older residents, neighborhood leaders, police officers, “serenos”, traders, and the competent authorities in providing public safety service. These six actors were also chosen for two important reasons: i) the differences of feelings about victimization; and ii) their knowledge of the events in their neighborhood.

Younger and older people were also important for the research. Young people because they stay more time outside their homes and know how the neighborhood is nowadays in terms of new activities, customs, and routines. Older people because they have been living there for many years, and they can describe the changes the neighborhood has suffered. Older people can also compare the present with the past in terms of how the levels of crime and the feeling of fear of crime were before. Also, some of the older people are neighborhood leaders, so they know more about the collective efficacy strategies and how the social capital among residents has evolved.

It was also important to listen to the ideas of the police officers who work every day providing safety. They could tell us about how they proceed to enforce the law and state mechanisms of social control. Police officers also have the official discourse about the citizen security public policies of the national government. Talking with the Serenazgo was also fruitful because in recent years it has been increasing its presence in every neighborhood. Serenos provide more than just security; they try to stay in touch with neighbors, so that they have more information about the dynamics of violent crime. Similarly, participants such as traders who generally meet a lot of individuals are more aware of local narratives surrounding the neighborhood. Finally, the local authorities who manage the local policies on citizen security are in contact with citizens and know what events related to crime happen every day.

At the same time, under constant and close observation of the environment where the interview took place, a non-participating observation checklist was used, intended to record the general characteristics of neighborhoods such as the composition of buildings; the state of the streets; the presence of social actors involved in crimes such as gangs or supporters; the existence of devices for preventing crime; and finally, the presence of effective enforcement, both police and community policing.

To complement the non-participating observation guide, a questionnaire with open questions was used to collect information in a timely manner in relation to certain activities executed in

the neighborhoods. Based on this logic, the themes that were included in this questionnaire related to the existence of mechanisms for control and prevention of crime in the neighborhood, the presence of social organizations, the experiences of collective action by the authorities, and the work done by the police and the "serenos". The questionnaire had a total of 18 questions. As a final tool, a questionnaire with closed questions was applied to pedestrians who were visiting the area in order to know the path they frequently use and reasons for coming that way. The questionnaire also asked about the opinions about the zone, whether they were afraid to walk along the streets, and whether they had been robbed, or had in mind the risk of being robbed.

In particular the interviews in the last stage of the field work were implemented according to the type of actor; only 12 questionnaires with open questions were taken, 5 in Barrios Altos, 4 in Mirones, and 3 in Miraflores. Also, the non-participant observation, applied during all the field work, was considered. In the end, we received 18 non-participant checklists: 5 for Mirones, 7 for Miraflores, and 6 for Barrios Altos.

Added to this, in both areas of Miraflores we could get information from all the types of actors. Likewise, in Mirones as well as in Barrios Altos, we could interact with neighbors, leaders, merchants, and young folks, but not with security forces such as serenos and police officers. For the four areas studied, we could say that it was possible to interview 4 merchants, 4 young people, in some cases too young or at the limit age, 7 neighborhood leaders, 2 policemen, 2 serenos, and 6 ordinary citizens.

## Findings

In the following section, I present the empirical findings of the research.

### Transformations in the Neighborhoods

As a starting point we present what people think about the transformations in the four neighborhoods. This knowledge is relevant because it is a study component suggested by social disorganization theory. If people perceive more incivilities or a greater heterogeneity of customs than before, this can be a signal of dissatisfaction with the place where they are living. A first way to collect this information was defining what participants consider their neighborhood. In the case of Barrios Altos, a neighbor told us

*"my neighborhood primarily is Jardín Rosas de Santa María", then would continue with the surroundings "[...] Santa Rosa, Omartinetti [...] without Amazonas [...] almost all around" (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014).*

This delimitation and that of the rest of the participants in Barrios Altos allow us to document some changes in terms of infrastructure as well as security issues.

The deterioration of most of the infrastructure of homes in different parts of Barrios Altos was evident, and was highlighted by the precarious housing and unpaved pedestrian roads that give access to the area known as “La Huerta Perdida”. This particular area had no road access for vehicles; it had only pedestrian entrance. This was the initial assessment of the area from a general observation, not very different from what was mentioned by some interviewees such as Karen Lavado Zambrano, a merchant in La Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos (06.03.2014).

This description follows the idea of the picture of how the neighborhood was almost 40 years before (Fukumoto, 1976). That situation has not changed to and this perception is similar to the changes in neighborhood security

*"because there have been changes in several young men.... they are worse now rather than better, because they are dedicated to drug addiction, liquor, and theft [...] these people are the result of the dependence on their own mothers... But when you want to say something, they bother you" (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014).*

The ideas of this interviewee give us some evidence about how citizens perceive incivilities in their community and how this could be related to fear of crime as social disorganization theory suggests, and what some researchers have found using a quantitative methodology (May and Dunaway, 2000; Pain, 2000; Silverman & Della-Giustina, 2001; Ferguson and Mindel, 2007).

Mirones, a neighborhood with the appearance of a closed condominium, consists of a large number of blocks and buildings with small apartments (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014; Carlos Omar Escalante Diaz, young neighbor in Mirones, 15.03.2014). The perceived changes clearly point to the deterioration of security in the neighborhood

*"when I was a child, we used to leave the door open and the house ended in the square, there was no need to close the door. Since 90s suddenly it has become dangerous to walk at night, before I came here by bike, now I do not dare, in the morning I can but I'm afraid to ride back at night, because I have to go through this [...] obviously it is not like before" (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014).*



These opinions also reinforce the evidence that in Lima Cercado there is a perception that before it was a good place to live, but now things have gotten worse, and there is a kind of generalization that people are at risk of being robbed. This situation is basically caused by the deterioration of the physical infrastructure of the neighborhood and also by the appearance of incivilities as Taylor's research (2001) concludes.

The situation shown in Miraflores, and, in particular, in the two neighborhoods considered, is far from what was appreciated in Barrios Altos and Mirones although there is also a clear difference between Santa Cruz and La Aurora. Regarding Santa Cruz, one of the interesting findings was that the perception of the neighborhood by respondents was to consider the whole area their neighborhood. "Santa Cruz, all the Santa Cruz area actually represents my neighborhood" says Reynaldo Jara Falcon, a young citizen in Santa Cruz (17.03.2014). A possible answer for this is the sense of belonging, developed because of the long history of this neighborhood compared with other neighborhoods in Miraflores.

Recent changes in Santa Cruz in terms of increased deployment of security from community policing motivate more positive feelings by citizens about their area of residence.

*"If I am still living and residing in the area is because my expectations in time have seen improvements [...] when I came to this neighborhood, this neighborhood was completely different, dark, little surveillance and it was quite insecure [...] but now today I like the area (because it) has improved in security, now we have cameras, surveillance and more patrols." (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).*

*"We would suggest that the modernization of the neighborhood is represented by the buildings, by the gradual disappearance of old small stores and by the perceived improvements in the field of security." (Carlos Alberto Carranza Briones, neighborhood leader of Santa Cruz, 18.03.2014).*

For some people, La Aurora is seen as a whole neighborhood. Based on the assessment of a zonal leader, we can see coincidences with the zone made by local government.

*"My neighborhood is the area 13D, which consists of Capulies, Esquenone, Espinoza, Augusto Gutiérrez is my street, Vera Collahuaso, the Capulies, Luis Garcia, and this whole area [...] even Villaran to Tomas Marzano and Marzano to the oval on Benavides [...] that is my neighborhood" (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

One possible interpretation of this coincidence is related to the history and the similar infrastructure. Since its origins, it has had the physical characteristic of a residential area.

In relation to the opinions about changes in the neighborhoods, La Aurora is not the exception.

*"Before there wasn't much security as now, for example, since half of last year, do not know why, I see Serenazgo on every corner, there is always a bike every 5 minutes, the cars pass every 5 minutes I think, there are also video surveillance cameras and these are noticeable"*

says Jeffrie Miguel Angel Garcia Barrueto, a young citizen of La Aurora, 13.03.2014. Until now, these improvements in the neighborhood have been successful in the field of security. This can be shown in the ability to walk around the neighborhood without any fear as was expressed by Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, a neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014.

In general, citizens realize that their neighborhoods have changed in recent years. The most important changes are related, in the neighborhoods of Lima Cercado, to a worsening of the feeling of insecurity; and in Miraflores to a greater sense of presence of the Serenazgo, which in other words can be understood as a greater sense of safety.

For Lima Cercado, the findings are consistent with the premises of the social disorganization theory, which suggests that the higher the physical disorder and the increase of incivilities in a given community are, the greater the feelings of vulnerability and fear of crime (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Our findings bear out the literature testing social disorganization theory by using a quantitative methodology that suggests that increased neighborhood disorder increases fear of crime (Lane and Meeker, 2003; Ferguson and Mindel, 2007; Tseloni and Zarafonitou, 2008), and, consequently, reduces community cohesion (Markowitz et al., 2001).

The findings in Miraflores are consistent with the literature about the positive externalities of community policing in the reduction of fear of crime. This is basically in the aspects where the police work on crime prevention strategies that are based on agreements with neighbors and with which the latter collaborate with new information about possible threats in the neighborhood. These efforts are known as police-citizen partnerships, which maintain social stability and promote local social control (Johnston, 2001; Sampson, 2001; Silverman and Della-Giustina, 2001, Ferguson and Mindel, 2007).

**'The Serenazgo Only Provide Security in Secure Areas'**

Many of the problems linked to the issue of security in the neighborhoods studied are related to the presence of competent institutions as guarantors of security. However, in

cases such as Barrios Altos or Mirones, inside Lima Cercado district, citizens have a very poor image of these institutions and there is a permanent recognition of Serenazgo as limited by law compared with the police. This consideration is relevant to understand the community policing, which is managed by local government in this district, but does not have the privileges that the police has. In other words, Serenazgo cannot use weapons or arrest people because it is composed of civilians, and if a “sereno” arrests a robber, the robber can denounce him. Some neighbors stated the following related to a “sereno”:

*"it is a civilian like us, but I treat him according to the law [...] they are not educated, not like the local police we had before [...] they had an almost military discipline and were in uniform [...] but these watchmen today, do not even know where they stand, do not know the ordinances" (Elsa Collado de Valentino, a neighborhood leader in El Buque, Barrios Altos, 11.02.2014).*

This initial problem is compounded by the limited presence of elements of this institution in the neighborhood:

*"watchmen are not present [...] situated at the entrance of the neighborhood are like an ornament because they do not even go down, not even when seeing that they are stealing right there, you cannot run and come [...] they say that they are only trained for two square meters, they cannot leave their square" (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014).*

With this assessment, general rules do not create the necessary incentives for Serenazgo to make sacrifices regarding their fight against crime in a neighborhood that is marked by high levels of crime and fear of crime.

The reality of Serenazgo in Mirones is not far from what happens in Barrios Altos. The residents indicate lack of presence of Serenazgo or that this presence is limited exclusively to important dates during the year (Gloria Jhon Lucho, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 15.03.2014), or when they started working in the neighborhood (Nivia Lucrecia Paulette, neighborhood leader in Mirones, 16.03.2014).

According to the size of the neighborhood the presence of Serenazgo or of the police was reduced to only certain sectors of the neighborhoods and as some respondents mention,

*"they are only limited to some parks and streets"*



as Oscar Silva Morales, a merchant in Mirones, mentions (15.03.2014); and Carlos Omar Escalante Diaz, a young citizen of Mirones stated (15.03.2014).

In Miraflores, the Serenazgo image is better than that of the police even though both work together. "It's more frequent to see Serenazgo, maybe occasionally the police, but this rarely happens" (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014). The explanation for this is the lack of logistical capacity of the police and the legal restrictions for the Serenazgo, which leads to a joint force to address crime and do their job efficiently, being recognized and accepted by the members of the neighborhoods studied (Jeffrie Miguel Angel Garcia Barrueto, young neighbor in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).

Table 2 shows an interesting comparison of what was described previously. The Serenazgo is a kind of community policing, and as such is a support organization for the police in terms of human capital and resources, but does not replace it. In neighborhoods with more robberies and thefts such as Barrios Altos it may not work, simply because the conditions are adverse, and in "Mirones" the presence of Serenazgo is limited. Miraflores is a district with less street crime and has an infrastructure that enables movement without major obstacles such as exist in Lima Cercado, so the "serenos" work without problems. In this case, thefts at homes, galleries and shops would be more planned because the thieves would have to know how to sneak in easily, and skip the obstacles.

Consequently, with the previous findings about changes in the neighborhoods, we can establish that there are differences among Serenazgos mainly because of two aspects: i) the levels of robbery and theft in the neighborhoods; and ii) the levels of economic resources held by local governments. We can suggest that when a low budget is mixed with a violent crime environment, the Serenazgo will not be present in the neighborhood; thus, it is not reliable and is less effective. On the other hand, we can also suggest that when a high budget is combined with a less violent crime environment, the Serenazgo is frequently present; it is more reliable and is more effective. But these insights more than proposing a precise characterization of a Serenazgo in Lima, suggests that this community policing developed in Lima is oriented to ameliorate some urban problems related to violent crime. It is difficult to think what a group of serenos can do if crime begins to be organized or if the number of homicides increases.

**Table 2. Some characteristics of Serenazgo and the police in the 4 neighborhoods**

Neighborhood	Actor	Is it present?	Is it reliable?	Is it effective?	Does it have resources?
--------------	-------	----------------	-----------------	------------------	-------------------------

Barrios Altos	Serenazgo	It isn't. There are no patrols, just booths	It isn't. It has a bad image	It isn't	Lack of resources and cannot keep up with the staff
	Police	Almost never. Only its patrols go around occasionally	A little bit	It isn't	It doesn't have enough staff and resources
Mirones	Serenazgo	Occasionally. Its headquarters is outside the neighborhood	Not so much	Neighbors know it is limited by law	Has better logistics than the police
	Police	Almost never- Only its patrols go around occasionally	A little bit	It isn't	It doesn't have enough staff and resources
Santa Cruz	Serenazgo	Yes, almost always	It is reliable	Yes, because it complements the police authority	Yes, equipment and staff
	Police	For a short time, it is only seen when it works with Serenazgo	Yes, but less than Serenazgo	It is effective but with support from Serenazgo	It has staff and resources but sometimes is limited
La Aurora	Serenazgo	Yes, almost always	It is reliable	Yes, because it complements the police authority	Yes, equipment and staff
	Police	For a short time, it is only seen when it works with Serenazgo	Yes, but less than Serenazgo	It is effective but with support from Serenazgo	It has staff and resources but sometimes is limited

Prepared by the author

## Non-organized Collective Efficacy

One way to deal with crime and fear of crime is by generating a shared sense of trust and willingness. This thin social capital was termed “collective efficacy” by Sampson and his colleagues (Villarreal and Silva, 2006: 4). In some areas within the neighborhood of Barrios Altos, people have – on their own initiative – organized themselves to choose mechanisms that do not involve a high economic cost but can become effective, and the use of whistles was mentioned by some of the respondents.

*"In some places I do not know if it's Maynas, some streets, when they view people from another side coming [unknown] they blow their whistles. I do not know if they continue with this practice because it was a long time ago. But it was a way of alerting the neighborhood when someone is about to rob someone" (Oscar Jose Yarleque, neighborhood leader in Barrios Altos, 15.03.2014).*

In one case someone told a peculiar story

*"when someone was waiting to steal, I told him, 'hey love, not here on this corner, because I know you. If the police comes and asks who stole, I'll have to talk and I do not want to accuse you, I'm no snitch, go away where you will not be seen' [...] that way I have been cleaning my same corner"* (Elsa Collado de Valentino, neighborhood leader in El Buque, Barrios Altos, 11.02.2014).

Despite this clearly particular experience, it is something that cannot be seen as a mechanism to be applied in the various areas within the neighborhood because not every offender lives in the neighborhood; he can come from other district, and offenders will not have the same respect for someone who expels them in that way. In this neighborhood, most of the cases the economic factor arises as a deterrent to neighbors to acquire tools to safeguard their homes; in some cases, they just have a fence in the entrance door (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014).

In Mirones, one of the most often used collective mechanisms to prevent thefts among neighbors was to opt for the installation of devices such as fences and bars at the beginning and at the end of a passage. Added to this initiative

*"it was agreed that each neighbor has a whistle and when you see something like strange people, you blow the whistle and all of us can hear and go"* (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014).

This initiative is practiced in many parts of Mirones, and it is practiced where there are adjoining neighbors who may have the time and know the signal (Nivia Lucrecia Paulette, neighborhood leader in Mirones, 16.03.2014; Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014). If neighbors are not available, it is common to leave a member of the family looking after the house (Carlos Omar Escalante Diaz, young neighborhood in Mirones, 15.03.2014).

In the neighborhood of Santa Cruz the mechanisms used are, because of the pressure made by local government, preventive mechanism against theft.

*"Prepare your best, follow the criteria of the municipality, which gives many criteria to take into account, be very careful and cautious [...] nothing more"* (Carlos Alberto Carranza Briones, neighborhood leader of Santa Cruz, 18.03.2014).

While some neighbors only choose to have a good fence in front of the entrance door (Reynaldo Jara Falcon, young neighbor in Santa Cruz, 17.03.2014; Rosa Yaure de Velasquez, an ordinary citizen in Santa Cruz, 17.03.2014), this situation changes when it relates to a commercial center

*"the staff working here in this business, not only works internally but also works externally [...] we care for clients in their internal presence as external presence because you cannot imagine that a customer leaves the store with a gallon of paint and on the street he is stolen, that ultimately is a disservice to the client and creates a bad concept of the area, that the area is unsafe [...]" (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).*

People in Santa Cruz also see with great pleasure that the local government of Miraflores has placed surveillance cameras and has arranged the Serenazgo staff in the many streets of the neighborhood (Ernesto Alfredo Nuñez Mesa, a sereno of Santa Cruz; Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014). But this logic seems to generate disconnection among citizens, who perceive that there are no cases of security breaches, thus, the integration among them is limited, only happening when there are critical events. This is reflected in the absence of preventive mechanisms for collective action (Reynaldo Jara Falcon, young neighbor in Santa Cruz, 17.03.2014; Rosa Yaure de Velasquez, an ordinary citizen in Santa Cruz, 17.03.2014).

In the case of La Aurora, the residential area of Miraflores, the mechanisms of crime prevention are restricted to the household level, i.e. each family or individual applies their own preventive mechanism unlike what was seen in the two cases in the Cercado de Lima district. The neighbors in La Aurora have the financial capacity to invest in the security.

*"First, because of the lack of lighting, we have arranged illumination; at 6 pm I turn on all the lights, and I have put an iron door, locks on every door, and put an electric fence [...] I put both here and outside [...] and when I leave home, my housekeeper knows she shouldn't open the door" (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

About collective efficacy initiatives,

*"we really have not met yet because as I tell you it has been a bit difficult to break the barrier of 'let's meet'" (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

Apart from the lack of integration among neighbors, there is overconfidence in the work of Serenazgo, motivating in some cases, the absence of any preventive mechanism

*"for the same reason I trust the Serenazgo, I'd be lying if I tell you I have an alarm, and besides that, I live in an apartment in a building of four floors [...] so my building is never alone" (Cecilia Lértora de Zouza, neighbor of La Aurora).*

Overconfidence can be said that it not only works on an individual basis, but also keeps citizens disunited in taking preventive measures

*"I have heard in other districts that there are assaults, so citizens create their own mechanisms, buy their cameras and all but in my community where I live, no one has any idea about that, I think they believe Serenazgo patrols every 5 minutes" (Jeffrie Miguel Angel Garcia Barrueto, young neighbor in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

Summarizing, contrary to what happens in Barrios Altos and Mirones, the confidence the serenitos generate in the neighborhood is strong enough for people to stop thinking about the need to prevent crime.

Individual prevention mechanisms are the more widespread than collective ones. The collective initiatives are temporary and are applied only for a few days after there has been a robbery or theft, and the neighbors affected have communicated their concern to others. As seen in Table 3, individual prevention mechanisms are the most used, and if we locate neighborhoods of Miraflores, we can see that they have more mechanisms because they have more resources. Clearly, there is more investment in Miraflores in private security, which is manifested in the use of telecommunications technologies.

**Table 3. Individual and collective mechanisms of crime prevention.**

Neighborhood	Individual mechanisms of prevention	Collective mechanisms of prevention
<b>Barrios Altos</b>	Use of door locks; someone always stays at home to look after with the lights on. Do not walk at night.	Use of whistles
<b>Mirones</b>	Someone always stays at home to look after with the lights on; use of reinforced doors. Do not walk at night	Use of bars and whistles
<b>Santa Cruz</b>	Use of cameras in stores, reinforced doors	Not very common

<b>La Aurora</b>	Use of cameras inside and outside the house, alarm systems , electric fences, and hired watchmen	Not very common
Prepared by the author		

### **“Social Capital Still Needs to Be Developed”**

Literature about violent crime and fear of crime emphasizes the importance of social capital as a source to maintain social control and to establish community policing more easily (O’neill, 2010: 489; Rosenfeld et al., 2001). According to Putnam “social capital manifests itself through shared memberships in secondary associations, high levels of interpersonal trust and interaction, and norms of aid and reciprocity and consists of two interrelated dimensions: trust and civic engagement. Trust induces sociability and cooperation, which reinforces norms of reciprocity and facilitates collective action. Civic engagement breeds future cooperation and promotes coordinated efforts” (Hawdon and Ryan 2009: 529). What we found in the four neighborhoods would suggest low levels of both trust and civic engagement. With some differences, we can say that neighborhoods in Lima Cercado at least attempt to stay organized, but it is not very effective.

In the cases of both Barrios Altos and Mirones, the interviewees affirm that they encourage neighborhood meetings at least once per month (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014). Added to this, there are meetings of Neighborhood Councils in Barrios Altos every 15 days on average as Elsa Collado de Valentino, a neighborhood leader in El Buque, Barrios Altos (11.02.2014) stated. It is very interesting to find these affirmations about recent efforts to maintain a type of organization even though we have found that after many years these organizations have not been effective enough because of a lack of participation and fulfillment of agreements. This suggests that even when these organizations are strong, they are still at a formative stage. Policing by neighbors is still remote from people’s lives.

In the case of Miraflores, the existence of neighborhood organizations is promoted by local government through the presence of a delegate. The respondents recognize both in Santa Cruz and La Aurora, the lack of initiatives in their neighborhoods to discuss particular issues, propose possible solutions, and take actions.

*“Because the Municipality is responsible for seeing many things, sidewalks, asphaltting, people just send letters, but the Municipality needs to be more communicated [...] when [neighbors] they expose and learn to say 'look neighbor, we really need to regroup, we will do it'” (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

The field work in Miraflores shows that most of the responsibility for the safety is transferred to the Municipality, which does not generate the necessary incentives, either for necessity or for urgency, in the neighbors to join in groups or in associations.

Evidence would suggest that social capital is precarious in the four neighborhoods. There are only social organizations such as "neighborhood associations" in Barrios Altos, but they do not have much strength to face crime, or to set clear demands to the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima. Instead, individual mechanisms prevail and these rely heavily on the financial resources available to each family as has been seen previously.

These findings provide some new insights into how social capital is related to crime and fear of crime. Literature suggests that economic disadvantages in a community debilitate families, institutions, and networks (Hawdon and Ryan, 2009; Harkness & Newman, 2002; Browning et al., 2004). This is something we could find in both Barrios Altos and Mirones. Citizens in these neighborhoods live in precarious ways and the efforts to make collective activities for crime prevention do not have concrete results primarily because of the lack of economic resources.

Conversely, neighborhoods in Miraflores, which have enough economic resources and are supposed to mobilize better collective action, are possibly an exception in the literature about social capital according to Sampson (2001) and Putnam (2000). Basically because even when they have institutional resources, and, thus, have more opportunities to reinforce social norms to protect common goods, citizens only trust their closest neighbors. This is like informal social capital in its minimum expression. Hence, it can be a contradiction, but it has sense when citizens only want to take care of themselves and see the collective actions as a waste of time or money. They prefer being isolated and investing in safety devices for their homes, cars, and themselves. These findings coincide with those in the previous sections related to changes in the neighborhood, mainly because the Serenazgo of Miraflores have played a major role in providing security.

## Victimization Experiences

Despite the belief of further victimization surveys, according to local residents, theft is not very common in "La Huerta Perdida" as it is in other areas of Barrios Altos. Neighbors say that mostly those who are the victim of a robbery are people who go there for commercial purposes, or who are simply outsiders. There are burglaries, but these are sporadic moments.

*"A year ago my house got stolen, I looked at my husband and he said, '[they] have broken the door' [...] One took the stereo and I wanted to get off quickly but my son grabbed me*



*and said 'let it go, you can get hurt', and they "cleaned" the house even though it was barred" (Victoria Luna Caldas, neighborhood leader in Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 18.02.2014).*

There are also frequently robberies in the street ("robo al paso") "one day I was taking a bus in Buenos Aires Square, when I got into the bus a thief pulled my briefcase and I fell down; fortunately, I didn't fall into the berm. I did not see well but it seems that the thief got into La Quinta San José" (Oscar Jose Yarleque, neighborhood leader in Barrios Altos, 13.02.2014). After some interviews, neighbors agreed that criminals in the area do not attack them, but they focus more on the surrounding neighborhoods and on outsiders.

The opposite occurs in Mirones, which from the experiences mentioned by the interviewees, both direct and indirect victimization are appreciated. A clear example was mentioned by Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones (12.03.2014):

*"I was robbed at the bus station in The Colonial [an avenue] when there wasn't The Solidarity Hospital, by a boy with a knife at 11 pm".*

Surprisingly all respondents have witnessed robberies and thefts directly and indirectly.

*"My son and my daughter, both have been stolen, in the case of my daughter, he [the robber] put the key [knife] here [neck] [...] being 8am in the morning" (Gloria Jhon Lucho, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 15.03.2014).*

The facts of victimization not only happen in the solitude of the edges of the neighborhood (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014), but even in the same line of the police station "look my mom was assaulted in front of the police station, when it was 4pm in the afternoon" (Nivia Lucrecia Paulette, neighborhood leader in Mirones, 16.03.2014).

Clearly, the infrastructure and the size of the Mirones neighborhood permit, in any way, these levels of victimization, and this is exacerbated overnight. The bad illumination that was not only mentioned by the interviewees, but that could also be perceived while carrying out the field work, shows a desolate and dark place. Within the neighborhood there are only passages or corridors, which can provide the offender the conditions to commit a crime, and lead to a possible neglect of the victim

*"they stole my son when he was coming back home, sometimes there are dark passages at night. But I've heard from other neighbors that yes they have been totally stolen. I think*



*robbers pay more attention to people who are distracted or unprotected, I do not know, one of those two reasons, not because they know from whom to steal" (Oscar Silva Morales, merchant in Mirones, 15.03.2014).*

In the case of Santa Cruz, there are not any victimization experiences that interviewees mentioned; many make mention of how it was before.

*"We had a neighborhood with a high crime rate and problems involving the presence of drugs and theft" (Ernesto Alfredo Nuñez Mesa, a sereno of Santa Cruz).*

*"It was very quick, a quick jump, came with a gun and assaulted [...] but it was 20 years ago, and then happily there has not been another act like that again" (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).*

The situation has changed and while there are still some crimes, those are not of the same proportions as were the ones before. Serenazgo is perceived in many cases as guarantor for security,

*"I was the victim of extortion 2 years ago [...] I communicated what was happening to me and I went to the module and they said 'do not worry Rodolfo, you're a neighbor we all have to help,' and there was support, they knew my schedule, and because I was threatened with paying a quota [to the robbers], they came and made a round, they put a patrol vehicle next to my home, I felt supported" (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).*

In La Aurora the cases of robbery and theft were sporadic. "My son was assaulted sitting in his car, just when he was going out, a car appeared and a man in a suit told him "give me everything you have" and he pointed with a gun (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014). The only direct victimization was a young male

*"I was coming to my house and I was like 6 houses from my house and I was coming, and I heard footsteps behind me and it was a person running, it was normal, he looked normal but when he got just near me, he touched my shoulder and said' give me everything you have, [...] give me all, your phone, everything" (Jeffrie Miguel Angel Garcia Barrueto, young neighbor in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

Most of the respondents did not suffer any kind of victimization, and when they made reference to such events, they said that that had happened in other districts and several years ago.

From the field work, we can suggest that the participants of the neighborhoods of Lima Cercado have suffered more robberies and thefts than those of Miraflores. One possible explanation for this difference would be the participation of the community policing conducted by local government (Serenazgo) and the effective work of the police. Another explanation is basically related to the number of residents and floating population. In Lima Cercado, the population is over three times more than the population in Miraflores, which increases the chances of being robbed.

These findings are consistent with the ample literature that prior victimization of a criminal activity is related to fear of crime (May and Dunaway, 2000). The explanation is basically because "directly experiencing or indirectly witnessing a victimization experience in one's own neighborhood can augment an individual's level of anxiety, as the criminal activity has become a real and manifest event in the victim's psyche rather than a mere image projected by the media or some other symbol of crime present in the neighborhood, such as graffiti or vandalism" (Ferguson and Mindel, 2007: 324). The experiences of being robbed or assaulted in the neighborhoods studied are saved in the citizens' memories and are consolidated as experiences that can shape their daily routines. What is interesting in our results is that in contrast with the literature about victimization, we could not find any cases of homicides or rapes. In all cases it was about robberies and thefts.

### **Reduced Fear of Crime Related to Serenazgo Performance**

In Barrios Altos, fear of crime was reported in many of the interviews and it was most noticeable when neighbors comment on fear for their families when these visit them.

*"Virtually the family even don't want to visit us, the insecurity of all, crime, drugs, more for drugs because if those guys do not have drugs, what do they do? They are going to steal, they go to the corner and pull a handbag, for what?, to keep buying [drugs]" (Erika Meza Malasquez, young neighbor in La Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos)*

*"I feel safe because among neighbors they do not collide, do not collide, but because strangers come frequently, I cannot think what other people think, strangers come and go, buy their drugs and go" (Karen Lavado Zambrano, merchant in La Huerta Perdida, Barrios Altos, 06.03.2014).*

Neighbors not only tell their discomfort but also show that they are getting used to everything that happens in the neighborhood. Getting used to or enduring the level of crime seems to be the mechanism of adaptation to the context in which they live, mainly because they do not have enough financial resources to live in another district.

*"I feel safe living here [...] despite the fact that.... who do not feel safe are my children, suddenly another mentality, I have more experience when I walk alongside the dwellings, alleys and see other people's problems and I compare [...] those (fears) are nothing" (Elsa Collado de Valentino, neighborhood leader in El Buque, Barrios Altos, 11.02.2014).*

For Mirones, the changes in the levels of crime inside the neighborhood are related to fear of crime. Citizens remember that in the past the neighborhood was a quiet place.

*"Before it was quieter than now, now the problem is drug addiction [...] it has increased by 100% from the time I've lived here [...] before there were people who were drug addicts, adults, and young folks, but these were known, but not now, now [they] come from another side [...] boys from Grau (another neighborhood), Second Stage (another neighborhood), come from everywhere" (Nivia Lucrecia Paulette, neighborhood leader in Mirones, 16.03.2014).*

This means that the neighbors are not able to identify who they are and who their real neighbors are.

*"There's insecurity here, it's not like years ago when I could play here, I could play quietly, but my granddaughter would not [...] more than anything is because of the theft; and founders and creators of this neighborhood we are few, there are a lot of new people, quite unknown [...] delinquency in the end" (Gloria Jhon Lucho, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 15.03.2014).*

Fear of crime affects the neighbors depending on the time, the influx of people passing through (Gloria Jhon Lucho, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 15.03.2014; Nivia Lucrecia Paulette, neighborhood leader in Mirones, 16.03.2014), and the presence of police officers or "serenos". Only one of the interviewees gave a different version, but which also reflected fear.

*"I think we are safe now because of Serenazgo and also because of the bars, of course there is always the risk, you won't see me walking around alone [...] while there are*

*people and until some hour" (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014).*

A final consideration for this context, something that also appeared in Barrios Altos, is the relationship with people outside the neighborhood that can generate fear of crime and risk of victimization.

*"Those who come are from somewhere else, there isn't a safe neighborhood here because in 3 blocks we have the Argentina Avenue, 10 blocks farther there's Callao [...] so I cannot say it is safe because it is not independent" (Alicia Cirila Riojas Cañari, an ordinary citizen in Mirones, 12.03.2014).*

Santa Cruz is a neighborhood whose sense of fear of crime is limited to the good actions of Serenazgo, as some respondents recognize. They know that, despite some security, a crime can occur at any moment.

*"Look I have to say it is safe to a certain level, I cannot say 100% because people who are dedicated to crime move around, then at this time we are confident here, but tomorrow a band can start trading and it becomes unsafe, so there is no conclusive term, exact term for this situation" (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).*

The neighbors know that in Santa Cruz and in general in the district providing services of public safety is effective and it affects the perception of the neighbors, but they know that they are not "shielded" against what can happen (Rodolfo Perla Marquez, merchant of Santa Cruz, 14.03.2014).

The discourses of fear of crime reported by the citizens of Santa Cruz are similar to those in La Aurora. The difference lies in the availability of financial resources to purchase crime prevention devices. However, this does not remove the fear of crime.

*"Is it safe to travel at night for several places, only sporadic [victimization experiences] occur out there, but we have Serenazgo at all times, and this is true and neighbors see it and know it" (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).*

Last but not least, security investment is a result of the local government of Miraflores, which is constantly making the call for taking actions against crime (Maria Tarcila Abanto Chavez, neighborhood leader in La Aurora, 13.03.2014).

The literature states that fear of crime is not only produced by victimization experiences. In the Barrios Altos neighborhood it is peculiar that respondents who have suffered theft directly or indirectly mention that they feel little fear or do not feel anything. In Lima Cercado, we can suggest a sort of normalization of victimization experiences, and as a result, citizens will end up getting used to seeing robberies or thefts as everyday events. For the inhabitants of Miraflores it is clear that they have less fear because, although thefts and robberies are rare, the presence of the Serenazgo is i) more present than before, ii) works in safe places, and iii) complements its work with the police, so its participation ensures that residents feel safe living in their homes and walking through the neighborhoods.

## Conclusions

The ideas presented here – based on the reviewed literature – reveal the composition of the fear of crime in four neighborhoods of Metropolitan Lima. This city is relevant for research in Peru because of the concentration of victimization in terms of theft and robbery in 2012 (MININTER, 2013). The capital city has quite marked contrasts in terms of socioeconomic status and quality of life. In the neighborhoods Lima Cercado, Comas, San Juan de Lurigancho, for example, there is substandard housing, while in areas such as Surco, San Isidro, and La Molina the homes have all the facilities. However, in all districts we can find robbery and theft, so investigating the fear of crime in these different contexts is relevant since it shows how it builds on and expands.

First, it is appropriate to go back to the argument of Daniel Lederman et al. regarding their study on the links between social capital and crime. “The incidence of violent crime may diminish social capital by reducing the sense of trust among community members, or it may increase it through the formation of community organizations to fight crime. In summary, the relationship between social capital and violence and crime is multifaceted, and, therefore, worthy of study” (Lederman et al. 2002: 510). In this research, I found that the level of social capital among neighborhoods was meager. Both in Miraflores and in Lima Cercado there is a lack of interpersonal trust on which strategies of collective action could be based to prevent further victimization experiences. The case that reveals closer ties among neighbors is Mirones, but this is also motivated by the shape of the buildings (the homes are apartments in four-story buildings and common areas such as courts and garages are shared). But Mirones is also one of the neighborhoods where there are more recent experiences of victimization, which has encouraged communal initiatives.

Second, there is a lack of organization among neighbors to establish joint initiatives. There are neighborhood leaders, but they fail to bring neighbors together, and also fail to have much impact on local politics. For example, in Barrios Altos leaders meet once a month and

coordinate activities among neighbors, but they have failed to convey their demands to the authorities of the municipality of Lima. In Mirones, there are no strong associations; support is only among close neighbors and by junctures. In the two neighborhoods of Miraflores, neighbors do not organize meetings because they rely on the "Serenazgo". The neighborhood leaders say that the participation of the majority to guard the public good is related to payment of taxes.

Third, normalization of victimization is one more way in which individuals adapt to dangerous contexts. Some citizens of Barrios Altos – one of the most dangerous neighborhoods – do not recognize the place where they live as dangerous. They know that it may be dangerous for outsiders, but not for them. They advance the idea that criminals already know them and therefore do not attack them.

Fourth, fear of crime in the two neighborhoods of Miraflores has been reduced due to the work of the local government in providing public safety services. I.e., the Municipality of Miraflores through its "Serenazgo" has given neighbors greater confidence in walking on the streets alone and leaving their homes alone. This occurs even when it is known that the Serenazgo has legal limitations, that it is not armed, and that they cannot detain people.

Fifth, why is fear of crime widespread in Mirones or in Barrios Altos? There are some hints suggesting that it is because the community policing conducted by local government ("Serenazgo") is effective in places where there is less danger. The "Serenazgo" cannot enter these two neighborhoods of Lima Cercado in a carefree manner. Chiefs know that the staff would be affected as they do not have all the necessary equipment to deal with criminals. The "serenos" of Lima Cercado are in areas where there is less victimization, and less fear of crime. In the case of Miraflores, where there are no problems to walk anywhere, The Serenazgo tries to cover most of the public spaces. Compounding this difference, Miraflores and Lima Cercado have almost the same number of "serenos" despite the different size of the population: in Lima Cercado there is 1 "Serenos" per 250 inhabitants, while in Miraflores there is 1 "Serenos" for every 91 inhabitants.

Sixth, for more effective social control by local government, there is a partnership between the police and the Serenazgo in Miraflores, which is not the case in Lima Cercado. Coordination between the two state agencies results in joint operations and greater control, better transfer of information, and greater legitimacy for the job each does. In Lima Cercado there is no cooperation. Just the fact that there are no standardized statistics that allow comparison between them tells us that the two agencies work as autonomous entities. The result is a lack of credibility among the population.

We can try to identify the neighborhoods studied in the light of Hunter's theory about maintaining order. He states that there are three types of social control: private, parochial, and public control (Hunter, 1985). "Private control operates through neighborhood friendship

and kin networks. Parochial control relies on interpersonal networks and interlocking local institutions, such as neighborhood associations, churches, and schools, to maintain order. Public control emanates from the bureaucratic state. All three forms of control limit crime, but none is sufficient to cause order” (Hawdon and Ryan 2009: 529).

Seventh, in the neighborhoods studied, neighborhood associations are not sustainable, but rather circumstantial, which means that their performance is restricted to post-robbery events. In neighborhoods with higher victimization such as Barrios Altos and Mirones, there is more evidence of neighborhood associations that implement strategies to prevent theft. They decide if they will use whistles or iron bars. Because these are low-income neighborhoods, the actions people want are not implemented. In the neighborhood of Miraflores there are no strong social ties. This is observed in the absence of interpersonal trust among neighbors, and in the same way in the null creation of neighborhood organizations. Participation to establish mechanisms for prevention and control is directly associated with the “Serenazgo” (public control). The serenos are well respected and is considered effective in reducing crime and securing spaces where neighbors can live or walk without fear of crime.

Eight, the Serenazgo is a legal actor in the Peruvian citizen security system and its role inside the neighborhoods studied provides some insights into the way communities and local governments try to prevent and control violence. Even though its functions are not clear, the experience in Miraflores provides some insights into how it can be valuable in solving some incidents of violent crime such as robberies and thefts and in reducing fear of crime. The success of the Serenazgo in Miraflores is probably due to the lower levels of violent crime and rich economic resources, which makes it a distinctive case in Lima, even in Peru. But it is worth mentioning how a political institution such as a local government authority can manage its capacities in order to provide safety to its citizens, and thus increase its popularity. The current mayor has been reelected, and one of the reasons why he won the elections once again is because recognized the security services that he had provided.

Nine, the fact that we have not found any direct or indirect homicide experience tells us that in the neighborhoods studied, even in Barrios Altos, violent crime is low compared to other countries in Latin America (Imbush, Misse and Carrión, 2011). This research focuses on robbery and theft as most frequent, and most troubling, for local populations. In these neighborhoods fear of crime is more related to theft and larceny than to murder (PNUD, 2013).

The four neighborhoods in the two selected districts are part of the reality of Metropolitan Lima. North and South Lima have seen rapid population growth and infrastructure development. They are centers of economic dynamism, but people live with a lack of services and the levels of victimization are comparable with Lima Cercado. Further study of



these neighborhoods may provide more evidence to reinforce the importance of social capital and social control in relation to violent crime and fear of crime.

## Bibliography

Avendaño Hübner, Jorge, 1989. "Miraflores de Antaño". Lima, pp. 5-8.  
Andrés, Vicente. 1860. "Guía de Zaragoza". Zaragoza.

Ayres, R., 1998. *Crime and Violence As Development Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean*, World Bank Publications.

Berg, Bruce. 2007. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences* (6th ed). Boston: Pearson Education.

Boers K., 1991. *Kriminalitätsfurcht. Über den Entstehungszusammenhang und die Folgen eines sozialen Problems*. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurussozialen Problems. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus.

Brookman, Fiona & Robinson, Amanda. 2012. *Violent Crime*. In *The Oxford handbook of criminology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 563-594.

Brunton-Smith, Ian; Sturgis, Patrick 2011 "Do neighborhoods generate fear of crime? An empirical test using the british crime survey" en *la American Society of Criminology* (Vol 49 N° 2).

Bursik Jr, R., 1999a. *The Informal Control of Crime Through Neighborhood Networks*. *Sociological Focus*, 32(1), pp.85–97.

Bursik, R. J. (1988). *Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency: Problems and prospects*. *Criminology*, 26, 519-552.

Castiglione, D., Deth, J.W. van and Wolleb, G., 2008. *The handbook of social capital*. Oxford University Press.

Crawford, A. & Morgan, R., 2007. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*. In M. Maguire & R. Reiner, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford University Press, pp. 866–909.

Congress of the Republic of Peru. 2003. Law 27972. Organic Law of Municipalities. May 6.

Congress of the Republic of Peru. 2013. Draft law to regulate the service of Municipal Serenazgo. Available at:  
[http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/Contdoc01\\_2011.nsf/d99575da99ebf305256f2e006d1cf0/d12a7f28fe0f91a505257b71008064d0/\\$FILE/PL02258200513.pdf](http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/Contdoc01_2011.nsf/d99575da99ebf305256f2e006d1cf0/d12a7f28fe0f91a505257b71008064d0/$FILE/PL02258200513.pdf)

Crump, B. & Wellman, B., 1978. *Networks, Neithborhoods and Communities. Approaches to the Study of the Comunity Question*. Centre of Urban and Community Studies and Department of Sociology. University of Toronto, 97, pp.1–44.

De Haan, W., 2010. *Violence as an essentially contested concept*. In *Violence in Europe: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Ferguson, K.M. & Mindel, C.H., 2007. *Modeling Fear of Crime in Dallas Neighborhoods: A Test of Social Capital Theory*. *Crime & Delinquency*, 53(2), pp.322–349. Available at:  
<http://cad.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0011128705285039> [Accessed July 13, 2014]

Ferraro, K. & Grange, R., 1987. The Measurement of Fear of Crime. *Sociological Inquiry*, 57(1), pp.70–97.

Ferraro, K. (1995). *Fear of crime: Interpreting victimization and risk*. State University of New York: Albany

Forrest, R. & Kearns, A., 2001. Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood. *Urban Studies*, 38(12), pp.2125–2143.

Fukumoto, Nancy, 1976. "Relaciones raciales en un tugurio de Lima: el caso de Huerta Perdida". Lima, Tesis Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, pp 6-60.

Galea, S., Karpati, A. & Kennedy, B., 2002. Social Capital and Violence in The United States, 1974–1993. *Social science & medicine*, 55(8), pp.1373–1383.

Garland, David. 2000 "The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some preconditions of recent 'law and order' policies" in the *The British Journal of Criminology* (volume 40, No. 3).

Gibbs, Jack P., 1981. *Norms, Deviance and Social Control Conceptual Matters*. New York; London: Elsevier.

Hammersley, M., 2013. *What is Qualitative Research?* 1 edition ed. London; New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.

Hirtenlehner, H. & Farrall, S., 2013. Anxieties About Modernization, Concerns About Community, and Fear of Crime: Testing Two Related Models. *International Criminal Justice Review*, 23(1), pp.5–24.

Huhn, Sebastian, 2012. *Criminalidad y discurso en Costa Rica: reflexiones críticas sobre un problema social*, San José: FLACSO.

Hunter, A. J. 1985. Private, parochial, and public social orders: The problem of crime and incivility in urban communities. In G. D. Suttles & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *The challenge of social control: Citizenship and institution building in modern society* (pp. 230-242). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Johnston, L. 2001. Crime, fear and civil policing. *Urban Studies*, 38, 959-976.

LaGrange, R. L., Ferraro, K. F 1985 "The measure of fear of crime". *Southern Sociological Society*, Charlotte.

Lane, J. & Meeker, J.W., 2003. Fear of Gang Crime: A Look at Three Theoretical Models. *Law & Society Review*, 37(2), pp.425–456.

Langworthy, R. M. and Whitehead, J. T. (1986). "Liberalism and fear as explanations of punitiveness". *Criminology*, 24, 575-59.

LAPOP, 2012. *Cultura política de la democracia en Perú, 2012: Hacia la igualdad de oportunidades*, Lima: LAPOP, USAID, IEP, Vanderbilt.

Lederman, D., Loayza, N. & Menendez, A.M., 2002. Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter? *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 50(3), pp.509–539.

Levi, M., 1996. Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*. *Politics & Society*, 24(1), pp.45–55.

Lima Como Vamos, 2013. Encuesta Lima Cómo Vamos 2012, Lima: IOP-PUCP.

Lima Como Vamos, 2014. Encuesta Lima Cómo Vamos 2013, Lima: IOP-PUCP.

Lofland, John et al. 2006. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis*. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

López, Noam. 2013. Inseguridad y percepción de inseguridad en Lima, Perú. Serie Cuadernos de Investigación IOP. Lima: IOP – PUCP.

Markowitz, F. E., Bellair, P. E., Liska, A. E., & Liu, J. (2001). Extending social disorganization theory: Modeling the relationships between cohesion, disorder and fear. *Criminology*.

May, D. C., & Dunaway, R. G. (2000). Predictors of fear of criminal victimization at school among adolescents. *Sociological Spectrum*, 20, 149-168.

McCrea, R., 2005. Fear of Crime in Brisbane: Individual, Social and Neighborhood Factors in Perspective. *Journal of Sociology*, 41(1), pp.7–27.

Ministry of Interior, 2013. Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana 2013 – 2018. Lima: Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Ministerio del Interior.

Morgan, P. (1978). *Delinquent Fantasies*. London: Temple.

O'Neill, Megan. 2010. The Police Response to Crime. In *International Handbook of Criminology*. Shoham, S.G., Knepper, P. and Kett, M. eds. 1 edition ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Pain, R. (2000). Place, social relations and the fear of crime: A review. *Progress in Human Geography*, 24, 365-387.

Palmer, C. et al., 2005. "Danger lurks around every corner": Fear of Crime and its Impact on Opportunities for Social Interaction in Stigmatised Australian Suburbs. *Urban Policy and Research*, 23(4), pp.393–411.

PNUD. 2013. Informe Regional de Desarrollo Humano 2013-2014. New York: PNUD.

Putnam, R.D., 1995. Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *Journal of Democracy*, 6, p.68.

Rebecca J Siehr, "Fear of crime: Its impact, causes and consequences" (January 1, 2004). Dissertations (1962 - 2010) Access via Proquest Digital Dissertations.

Reiss, A.J. & J.A. Roth (Eds.) 1994. *Understanding and Preventing Violence*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press

Reyes Flores, Alejandro, 2005. "Los Barrios Altos: un espacio de Lima. Siglos XIX-XX". *Boletín del Instituto Riva-Agüero*, no. 32, pp. 223-246.

Sampson, R. J. and Wooldredge, J. D. (1986). "Evidence that high crime rates encourages migration away from central cities". *Sociology and Social Research*, 70, 310-314.

Sampson, R. J. (2001). Crime and public safety: Insights from community-level perspectives on social capital. In S. Saegert, J. P. Thompson, & M. R. Warren (Eds.), *Social capital and poor communities* (pp. 89-114). New York: Russell Sage.

Silverman, E. B., and Della-Giustina, J. (2001). Urban policing and the fear of crime. *Urban Studies*, 38, 941-957.

Scheingold, Stuart. 1984. *The politics of law and order: Street crime and public policy*. New York: Longman.

Taylor, Ralph 2001 "Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the Nationwide Fight Against Crime, Grime, Fear, and Decline". Boulder: Westview Press.

Tewksbury, Richard. 2009. "Qualitative versus Quantitative Methods: Understanding Why Qualitative Methods are Superior for Criminology and Criminal Justice". *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology*, 1(1).

Tseloni, A. and Zarafonitou, C., 2008. Fear of Crime and Victimization: A Multivariate Multilevel Analysis of Competing Measurements. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5(4), pp.387–409.

Vilalta Perdomo, C.J., 2010. El Miedo al Crimen en México: Estructura Lógica, Bases Empíricas y Recomendaciones Iniciales de Política Pública. *Gestión y política pública*, 19(1), pp.3–36.

Vanderstoep, S.W. and Johnston D.D. 2009. *Research methods for everyday life: blending qualitative and quantitative approaches*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Villarreal, Andrés and Silva, Bráulio. 2006. Social Cohesion, Criminal Victimization and Perceived Risk of Crime in Brazilian. In *Source: Social Forces*, Vol. 84, No. 3,

Warr, M. (2000). Fear of crime in the United States: Avenues for research and policy. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 4, 451–483

Weisburd, David; Groff, Elizabeth; R. Yang, Sue-Ming (2012): *The Criminology of Place. Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem*, Oxford: University of Oxford Press.

White, R. & Sutton, A., 1995. Crime Prevention, Urban Space and Social Exclusion. *Journal of Sociology*, 31(1), pp.82–99.

Wilson, J.Q., & Kelling, G. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. *Atlantic Monthly March*: 29-38.